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Abstract 
Background and objectives 
Biased processing of threat-related material plays an important role in the development of 
paranoid thinking. This has been demonstrated by superior memory for threat-related information 
in patients who report persecutory delusions and in non-clinical paranoia-prone participants. This 
study examined how emotional was recalled having been encoded in relation to one self or to 
another person, in people high or low in paranoid ideation. It was predicted that people high in 
paranoia would recall more threat-related material about others than people low in paranoia owing 
to being particularly alert to threats from other people. 
Methods 
Participants who reported high (N = 30) or low (N = 30) levels of paranoid thinking were 
presented with a series of threat-related and positive words and were asked to process them in 
terms of the self, or in terms of a fictional character.  
Results 
As predicted, when words were process in terms of another person, the high paranoia group 
recalled more threat-related words than positive words, but when words had been processed 
in terms of the self, recall of threat-related and positive words did not differ. In contrast, 
there was no interaction between word-valence and referent in the low paranoia group. 
Limitations 
These findings are drawn from an analogue sample. Replication in a sample of clinical 
participants who report persecutory delusions is required. 
Conclusions 
People high in paranoid ideation recalled threat preferentially in relation to other people.  Such 
information processing biases may help to understand the development and maintenance of 
persecutory beliefs. 
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1. Introduction 
Paranoia is characterised by suspicion and mistrust of other people (Freeman & Garety, 1999; 
Manschreck & Khan, 2006). It is a common experience, with a third or more of people reporting 
mistrust of those around them (Freeman, 2007). It has been argued that paranoid thoughts are part 
of a hierarchy or continuum of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005), with sub-clinical paranoid 
thoughts representing a milder, attenuated form of the persecutory delusions reported by people 
who have mental health problems (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Freeman, 2007). However, while 
sub-clinical paranoid thoughts are less distressing and pertain to less improbable events than 
persecutory delusions (Bentall & Udachina, 2013), many of the factors (e.g., reasoning biases, 
cannabis use, social adversity) that play a role in the development of persecutory delusions also 
appear to play a role in the development of paranoid thinking (e.g., Fine et al., 2007; Kelleher & 
Cannon, 2011). Thus, much can be learned about the development of persecutory delusions 
through the study of paranoid thinking in non-clinical participants. 
Cognitive models of paranoia and persecutory beliefs specifically recognise a role for 
biased processing of threat-related material in the genesis and maintenance of these ideas 
(e.g., Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001; Freeman, Garety, 
Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002). A number of studies have demonstrated that paranoia 
is associated with biases in attention towards threat-related information (see Green & Phillips, 
2004, for a review). Meanwhile, another set of studies have demonstrated that paranoia is 
associated with memory biases for threat-related material. For example, Bentall, Kaney, and 
Bowen-Jones (1995) presented participants with a list of 36 words, which were threat-related, 
depression-related, or neutral. Control participants recalled more neutral words than threat-
related words (recall for depression-related words fell between recall for threat-related and 
neutral words, and was not significantly different from either). In contrast, participants with 
persecutory delusions recalled more threat-related words than neutral words (again, recall for 
depression-related words fell between recall for threat-related and neutral words, and was not 
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significantly different from either). Similarly, Kaney, Wolfenden, Dewey and Bentall (1992) 
asked participants to read passages of prose that contained a mixture of threat-related and 
neutral propositions. When subsequently tested participants with persecutory delusions 
recalled fewer propositions overall than control participants. However, participants with 
persecutory delusions recalled more threat-related propositions than did control participants. 
This tendency towards better memory for threat-related material has also been demonstrated 
in non-clinical, paranoia-prone participants. For example, Larøi, D’Argembaue, and Van der 
Linden (2006) reported that non-clinical, paranoia-prone participants performed similarly to 
control participants when they were asked to recognise faces that had previously been 
presented to them with a happy expression. However, paranoia-prone participants were better 
than controls at recognising faces that had previously been presented to them with an angry 
expression.  
Thus, in both clinical and non-clinical samples, paranoid thinking appears to be 
associated with biases involving remembering threat-related material. One variable that has 
not yet been examined in these studies is whether the to-be-remembered material is processed 
with reference to oneself or with reference to another person. This is important because (a) 
memory performance is modulated by whether a person processes information in terms of the 
self, or in terms of another person, (b) memory performance can be modulated by a person’s 
beliefs, and (c) negative beliefs about the threat posed by others are at the heart of the 
experience of paranoid thinking.  
Numerous studies in non-clinical participants have reliably shown that stimuli that are 
processed with reference to the self are more likely to be recalled than are stimuli that are 
processed with reference to another person (the self-reference effect; Rogers, Kuiper, & 
Kirker, 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997). For example, in typical self-referencing studies, 
participants are presented with a series of trait adjectives (e.g., intelligent, shy) and, in 
separate conditions, whether that trait describes their personality or whether that trait 
 6 
describes another person’s (e.g., their best friend, their mother, the head of state) personality. 
Importantly, some studies have suggested that the emotional valence of the to-be-remembered 
stimuli interacts with this effect. For example, Miall (1986) reported that while participants 
who had been asked to process stimuli with reference to the self recalled more negative than 
positive phrases, participants who had been asked to process stimuli with reference to another 
person recalled more positive than negative phrases. Given that material that is consistent with 
a person’s pre-existing beliefs is more likely to be recalled than is material that is inconsistent 
with such beliefs (e.g., Swan & Read, 1981; Story, 1998), the bias towards better recall of 
negative material in relation to the self was explained in terms of the task promoting self-
evaluation and causing individuals to focus on their short-comings. Meanwhile, the bias 
towards better recall of positive material in relation to another (in this case, a friend) can be 
explained in terms of people generally holding positive beliefs about others. The pattern of 
results reported by Miall have not, however, been consistently replicated (e.g., Herbert, Pauli, 
& Herbert, 2011). This suggests that the effect is complex and may be modulated by a number 
of factors, including the identity of the other person that the to-be-recalled stimuli are 
processed with reference to. For example, if the ‘other’ is a familiar person—as in Bower and 
Gilligan’s (1979) study, where the ‘other’ was the participant’s mother—then participants 
may show the effect reported by Miall. This is likely to be because the majority of 
participants’ beliefs about that other person can be accurately inferred (i.e., most participants 
will have positive beliefs about their mother). In contrast, when the ‘other’ is an unfamiliar, 
famous person (e.g., a politician), then participants may show a different response pattern, and 
this may be because participants’ beliefs about that person are more difficult to infer. 
The present study examined the association between sub-clinical paranoid thinking and 
memory biases for threat-related material and how this might be modulated by whether 
stimuli are processed in terms of the self, or in terms of another person. This was done using a 
memory paradigm in which a series of threat-related and positive words had to be processed 
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with reference to the self or with reference to an ‘other’ who was a fictional, neutral character.  
Given that paranoid thinking is strongly associated with negative, threat-related beliefs about 
others (e.g., that others are untrustworthy and hostile; Fowler et al., 2006), participants high in 
paranoid thinking should have negative, threat-related beliefs about a novel person, while 
participants who report low levels of paranoid thinking should not hold such beliefs about the 
same character. As in many other studies, we expected participants to demonstrate the self-
reference effect. However, we also expected that, in paranoia-prone participants, there would 
be an interaction between word valence and referent (i.e., whether the word was processed in 
terms of the self, or in terms of another person). More specifically, we predicted that, when 
words had been processed in terms of another person, paranoia-prone participants would 
recall more threat-related than positive words, but that when words had been processed in 
terms of the self, paranoia-prone participants would recall a similar number of threat-related 
and positive words. In contrast, we predicted that no such interaction would be found in the 
control participants (i.e., those who report low levels of paranoid thinking). This was because 
the referent employed in the present study was a fictional character, about whom participants 
who report low levels of paranoid thinking were unlikely to have strongly valenced beliefs. 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 123 university and college students (19 males, 102 females) aged between 
18 and 58 years (M = 24.70, SD = 4.71). While all participants completed the tasks and 
questionnaires described below, data analysis refers only to those participants who scored in the 
top and bottom quartiles on a measure of paranoid thinking (Fenigstein & Vanable’s, 1992, 
Paranoia Scale; described in more detail in subsection 2.3.2). The low paranoia group consisted of 
30 participants (4 males, 26 females) aged between 18 and 35 years (M = 24.60, SD = 4.16). The 
high paranoia group consisted of 30 participants (3 males, 27 females) aged between 18 and 32 
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years (M = 23.06, SD = 3.45). The two groups did not differ in terms of gender (p = .69) or age (p 
= .24). 
2.2 Design 
A mixed between- and within-subjects design was used. Independent variables were 
paranoia group (high or low on a measure of paranoid ideation), referent (whether words were 
processed in terms of the self or in terms of another person), and word valence (threat-related 
or positive). The dependent variable was the number of words recalled.  
2.3 Materials and measures 
2.3.1 Recall task  
Stimuli were presented via two audio recordings (termed ‘A’ and ‘B’). Each audio recording 
was of a woman reading 40 words, with one word presented every six seconds. In each recording, 
half of the words were positively-valenced and half were threat-related words. In each recording, 
words were presented in a fixed, random order. 
The threat-related words were taken from Kinderman, Prince, Waller, and Peters (2003). 
However, 16 of these words were modified by changing their tense so that the threat-related word 
could be more easily matched to a positive word (e.g., ‘reject’ was used instead of ‘rejected’). 
Each threat-related word was matched to a positive word in terms of imagability, letter-length, and 
syllable length, using the MRC Linguistic Database (Wilson, 1988). The words employed are 
presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 about here please 
 
Five independent raters, who did not take part in the study, were asked to rate the 80 words in 
terms of pleasantness on a 7-point scale (1= extremely unpleasant; 7 = extremely pleasant) and in 
terms of threat on a 7-point scale (1 = extremely unthreatening; 7 = extremely threatening). As 
expected, positive words were rated as being more pleasant (M = 5.46, SD = 0.40) than were 
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threat-related words (M = 2.28, SD = 0.57), t(4) = 7.96, p < .001, d = 3.56. Similarly, the threat-
related words were rated as being more threatening (M = 5.21, SD = 0.33) than were positive 
words (M = 1.78, SD = 0.82), t(4) = 8.45, p < .001, d = 3.78. 
2.3.2 Paranoid thinking 
Proneness to paranoid thinking was assessed using the Paranoia Scale (PS; Fengistein & 
Vanable, 1992). This scale is the most widely used measure of sub-clinical paranoid thinking 
(Freeman, 2008) and consists of 20 statements that describe aspects of paranoid thinking (e.g., “It 
is safer to trust no one”, “I sometimes feel as if I am being followed”, “Someone has it in for 
me”). Participants are asked to what extent each statement applies to them, using a 5-point scale (1 
= not at all applicable to me; 5 = extremely applicable to me). Thus, scores can range from 20-
100, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of paranoid thinking. Previous studies have shown 
that the PS has good psychometric properties (e.g., high levels of internal reliability: α = .84; 
acceptable test-retest reliability over a six month period: r = .70; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and 
that it is strongly correlated (e.g., r = .71 to .81) with other paranoia measures (e.g., Green et al., 
2008). In this sample, the PS had good internal reliability (α = .88). 
2.3.3 Positive and negative affect 
Levels of positive and negative affect were assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994, 1999). This scale consists of 60 
words that describe positive (e.g., cheerful, happy, proud) or negative (e.g., tired, sad, scared) 
feelings or emotions. Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they have experienced 
each feeling or emotion over the past week on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very slightly or not at all; 
5 = extremely). We calculated participants’ total scores on the Basic Negative Emotion Scales, 
which consists of 23 items, and their total scores on the Basic Positive Emotion Scales, which 
consists of 18 items. Thus, scores on the negative affect subscale could vary from 23 to 115, with 
higher scores reflecting higher levels of negative affect. Meanwhile, scores on the positive affect 
subscale could vary from 18 to 90, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of positive affect. 
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Previous studies have shown that the PANAS-X subscales correlate with other measures of 
positive and negative affect (r = .85 to r = .91; Watson & Clark, 1994, 1999) and that the subscales 
have good test-retest reliability (positive affect subscale: r = .70; negative affect subscale: r = .71; 
Watson & Clark, 1994, 1999) and acceptable levels of internal reliability (positive affect subscale: 
α = .88; negative affect subscale: α = .85; Watson & Clark, 1994, 1999). Both subscales had 
excellent internal reliability (negative affect subscale: α =.94; positive affect subscale: α = .91) in 
the present sample. 
2.4 Procedure 
The study was approved by a departmental ethics committee and was conducted in 
accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants were tested in groups of 
15-30 and were informed that they were taking part in a memory task. However, they were told 
that the main focus of the study was on the vividness of their thoughts. Participants were told that 
they would listen to two sets of words and that for one set of words, they should imagine each 
word in relation to themselves (i.e., the self-referencing condition) and that for the other set of 
words, they should imagine each word in relation to a character in a story (i.e., the other-
referencing condition). They were then presented with a written description of a scenario of the 
person in a university library. The stranger was the only other person in the library with them. The 
description was ambiguous to leave open scope for people to imagine the stranger as being 
friendly or sinister depending on their tendency to be trustful or suspicious of others. The library 
scenario was chosen because it is a situation which will be salient and familiar to university 
students. Five independent raters, who did not take part in the study, were presented with this 
same information and were asked to rate the character in the story in terms of how friendly and 
how sinister the stranger was. They were also asked how at ease and how threatened they might 
feel in the situation described in the scenario and were invited to make comments. The stranger 
and scenario were rated fairly neutral on all of these measures. 
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Participants were then presented with the first set of words. As they performed this task, for 
each word, participants were asked to rate how vivid their mental imagery was, when they 
imagined that word with reference to themselves or to the character in the story, using a 5-point 
scale (1 = weak image; 5 = very strong image). The order in which participants were asked to 
perform the self-referencing encoding and the other-referencing encoding was counter-balanced. 
Similarly, for half of the sample, recording A was used in the self-referencing condition and 
recording B was used in the other-referencing condition, and this was reversed for the other half of 
the sample (this counter-balancing remained valid when the high and low paranoia groups were 
created). Immediately after the presentation of the words had stopped, participants were asked to 
freely recall as many of the words as possible. This was a pen and paper task, and participants 
were given up to four minutes to recall as many words as possible. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Preliminary analyses: high and low paranoia groups 
The low paranoia group consisted of the 30 participants who scored lowest on the PS (all 
scored below 32; M = 26.67, SD = 3.13), while the high paranoia group consisted of the 30 
participants who scored highest on the PS (all scored above 50; M = 60.37, SD = 6.53). As one 
would have expected, the difference between the two groups differed in terms of scores on the PS 
was significant, t(58) = 25.48, p < .001, d = 6.58. Similarly, the two groups differed in terms of 
negative affect and positive affect. The high paranoia group reported higher levels of negative 
affect (M = 63.20, SD = 20.33) than did the low paranoia group (M = 39.83, SD = 11.25), t(45.25) 
= 5.51, p < .001, d = 1.42.  The high paranoia group reported lower levels of positive affect (M = 
46.17, SD = 10.83) than did the low paranoia group (M = 57.10, SD = 12.28), t(58) = 3.66, p = 
.001, d = 0.94.  Importantly the effect size for group differences in paranoid thinking was 4 to 6 
times greater than the effect size for group differences positive and negative affect, suggesting that 
while the two groups differed in mood, they differed primarily in terms of paranoid thinking. 
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3.2 Preliminary analyses: vividness of imagery  
 The high paranoia group (M = 3.21, SD = 0.42) and low paranoia group (M = 3.25, SD = 
0.38) did not differ in terms of how vividly they processed each word, t(58) = 0.47, p = .64, d = 
0.10. Thus, vividness is not considered in any subsequent analyses.  
3.3 Paranoia-proneness, self- versus other-processing, and recall of threat-related material 
Descriptive statistics for recall performance are presented in Table 2. A 2 × 2 × 2 (referent × 
word valence × paranoia group) mixed ANOVA revealed that there was a main effect of referent, 
F(1, 58) = 21.86, p < .001, partial η2  = .27. Participants recalled more words that were processed 
with reference to the self (M = 9.20, SD = 4.29) than words that were processed with reference to 
another (M = 6.82, SD = 3.33). In contrast, there was no effect of word valence, F(1, 58) = 0.18, p 
= .67, partial η2 = .00. That is, participants recalled a similar number of threat-related (M = 8.10, 
SD = 3.79) and positive words (M = 7.92, SD = 3.59). There was, however, a main effect of 
paranoia group, F(1, 58) = 6.55, p = .013, partial η2 = .10. The high paranoia group recalled more 
words (M = 18.10, SD = 6.68) than the low paranoia group (M = 13.93, SD = 5.91).  None of the 
two-way interactions were significant (all p-values > .15). Importantly, however, there was a 
significant three-way interaction between referent, word valence, and paranoia group, F(1, 58) = 
9.70, p =.003, partial η2 = .14.  
 
Table 2 about here please 
 
 3.3.1 Investigating within-subject differences 
This three-way interaction was investigated using two separate (one including only the low 
paranoia group, one including only the high paranoia group), 2 × 2 (referent × word valence) 
ANOVAs. As can be seen in Figure 1, there was a different pattern of responding in the high and 
low paranoia groups. In the low paranoia group, there was a main effect of referent, F(1, 29) = 
8.53, p =.007, partial η2= .23, no effect of word valence, F(1, 29) = 0.00, p =1.00, partial η2 = .00, 
 13 
and no referent × word valence interaction, F(1, 29) = 1.43, p =.24, partial η2 = .05. In the high 
paranoia group, there was a main effect of referent, F(1, 29) = 13.54, p =.001, partial η2 = .32, no 
effect of word valence, F(1, 29) = 0.26, p =.61, partial η2 = .01, and a referent × word valence 
interaction, F(1, 29) = 10.08, p =.004, partial η2 = .26. Planned comparisons (two-tailed, 
independent group t-tests) revealed that the high paranoia group recalled more threat-related 
words than positive words when these had been processed with reference to the another person, 
t(29) = 3.08, p = .004, d = 0.51, but that there was no difference in their ability to recall threat-
related words and positive words that had been processed with reference to the self, t(29) = 1.35, p 
= .19, d = 0.30. 
Figure 1 about here please 
3.3.2 Investigating between-groups differences 
In addition to these analyses, we examined group differences in each condition (positive self; 
threat-self; positive-other; threat-other). Planned comparisons (two-tailed, independent group t-
tests) revealed that the high paranoia group recalled more positive words processed with reference 
to the self than did the low paranoia group, t(58) = 2.78, p = .007, d = 0.72.  The two groups did 
not differ in terms of their recall of threat-related words processed with reference to the self, t(58) 
= 1.03, p = .31, d = 0.26. Similarly, the two groups did not differ in terms of their recall of positive 
words processed with reference to another, t(58) = 0.39, p = .70, d = 0.10. However, the high 
paranoia group recalled more threat-related words processed with reference to another than did the 
low paranoia group, t(58) = 3.03, p = .004, d = 0.78.  
 
4. Discussion 
The present study examined whether processing to-be-remembered stimuli in terms of the 
self or in terms of another person modulated the recall of threat-related and positive material 
in paranoia-prone participants. As in previous research, participants demonstrated the self-
reference effect (Symons & Johnson, 1997; i.e., they recalled more words that had been 
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processed with reference to the self than words that had been processed with reference to 
another person). One surprising finding was that the high paranoia group had a higher level of 
overall recall than the low paranoia group. This was not expected. The superior performance 
of the high paranoia group is perhaps owing to a heightened alertness of salient stimuli both 
positive and threat related.   
In addition, and in line with our predictions, in paranoia-prone participants, there was a 
word valence × referent interaction effect, such that paranoia-prone participants recalled more 
threat-related than positive words that had been processed with reference to another person, 
but their recall of threat-related and positive words that had been processed with reference to 
the self did not differ. In contrast, but again in line with our predictions, there was no word 
valence × referent interaction effect in participants who reported low levels of paranoid 
thinking.  
We interpret these findings as suggesting that paranoia-prone participants hold threat-
related beliefs about others and so are more able to recall threat-related words that have been 
processed with reference to another person. In contrast, the present findings suggest that 
participants who report low levels of paranoid thinking hold essentially neutral beliefs about 
others, and so recalled a similar number of positive and threat-related words that had been 
processed in reference to another person. The use of a fictional, neutral character was 
probably crucial in achieving these results. Had participants been asked to process the words 
in terms of a friend, a relative, or a famous person, a different pattern of findings may well 
have emerged. For example, one would expect that participants who report low levels of 
paranoid thinking should hold positive beliefs about friends and relatives and so they would 
show biased recall for positive words that had been processed with reference to a friend or 
relative (as in Miall’s, 1986, study).  
Our finding of biased recall of threat-related words in paranoia-prone participants, under some 
conditions, is consistent with Larøi et al.’s (2006) report of a recognition bias for threat-related 
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faces in non-clinical, paranoia-prone participants. These analogue findings are in line with clinical 
studies that have reported recall biases towards threat-related material in psychosis patients with 
persecutory delusions (Kaney et al., 1992; Bentall et al., 1995). More broadly, these findings from 
studies that have employed memory-based paradigms are consistent with data showing attentional 
biases in patients with persecutory delusions and in non-clinical, paranoia-prone participants 
(Green & Phillips, 2004). Together, these findings provide support for models that have proposed 
biased processing of threat in the development of paranoid thinking (e.g., Bentall et al., 2001).  
Moreover, the present findings extend previous research by demonstrating that biased 
memory for threat-related information in paranoia-prone participants thinking is modulated by 
how that information is processed (i.e., it is present for other-referenced but not self-referenced 
information). In previous studies, participants have been given no guidance about how to encode 
threat-related stimuli, or it has not been possible to ask participants to encode the stimuli in terms 
of different referents (e.g., if the to-be-remembered stimuli were faces). In contrast, we instructed 
participants to imagine each word either in reference to the self, or in reference to another person 
and found that paranoia-prone participants only recalled more threat-related material when it had 
been processed with reference to another person. These findings are wholly in line with previous 
research on the importance of threat beliefs in paranoid thinking, given that people tend to recall 
information that is consistent with their beliefs (e.g., Swan & Read, 1981; Story, 1998) and that 
people who experience paranoid thoughts hold threat-based beliefs about others (i.e., that others 
are hostile and devious; Fowler et al., 2006), but presumably do not hold these beliefs about 
themselves (i.e., that they are not hostile and devious).  
Of course, it is recognised that there are several limitations that may affect this 
interpretation.  First, in contrast to most studies that have examined the self-reference effect, we 
used a set of words that were not exclusively trait adjectives (e.g., as well as including words such 
as stupid and bad, we included words such as maim and wound). It is possible that we would 
report different effects if trait adjectives had been used and this should be examined in future 
 16 
research. Second, we have interpreted our findings as reflecting better recall of threat-related 
information in paranoia-prone participants. However, it is possible that this better recall is a result 
of greater attention to threat-related words in paranoia-prone participants. Employing a different 
design (e.g., similar to that employed by Radomsky, Senn, Lahoud, & Gelfand, 2014) that 
controlled for possible effects of an attentional bias would be helpful in separating whether 
paranoia-prone participants demonstrate a memory bias for threat-related material that is 
independent of any attentional bias. Third, the focus of this study was on paranoid thinking, but 
predictions regarding participants’ recall were largely driven by what we know about the beliefs 
about the self and others paranoia-prone participants typically hold. Assessing these beliefs (e.g., 
using Fowler et al.’s, 2006, Brief Core Schema Scale) would have been helpful, as it would have 
allowed us to directly examine the associations between individual differences in beliefs about the 
self and about others and performance on the recall task. Fourth, while previous researchers 
(Kinderman et al., 2003) have characterized the words employed here as threat words, many of 
these words could be considered not to be threat words, but simply negative words (e.g., reject, 
alone, mock). However, Kinderman et al. argued that these can be considered to be threat words in 
that they reflect threat to a person’s social relationships. That being said, future research should 
examine the effect investigated here, but should make clear distinctions between different types of 
negative words – those that reflect physical threat, those that refer to social threat, as this was not 
possible.in the present study. Finally, this study involved non-clinical participants and it is unclear 
whether the effects reported here would be observed in a study that employed a clinical sample. 
Research that addresses the question investigated here using a clinical sample is warranted. 
Despite these limitations the results of the differential recall of threat related material 
in relation to others in people high in paranoid ideation may help us understand the 
maintenance of paranoid ideas. The net effect is a greater accessibility of threat related 
material in relation to other people, and this would presumably act as a potential risk factor to 
the development of more elaborated delusional beliefs. People high in paranoid ideas are 
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building up a bank of negative information about other people even in day to day and 
relatively benign interactions.   
This may provide understanding of why paranoid ideas are so difficult to treat. 
Seemingly, it is not just the content of thought that needs to be considered but also differences 
in processes. Cognitive therapy for psychotic symptoms like persecutory beliefs is currently 
of modest value (Wykes et al. 2008; van der Gaag, Valmaggia, & Smit, 2014) and perhaps 
this is owing to these differences in processing of material. Typically, efforts are made to 
normalise paranoid thoughts (Dudley, Bryant, Hammond, Siddle, Kingdon & Turkington, 
2007) and consider alternative explanations (Kingdon & Turkington, 2005). However, 
considering beliefs about others intentions and motives may well be a helpful process in 
developing a formulation that could serve as the basis for cognitive therapy for persecutory 
beliefs and that may lead to interventions that encourage people develop trust in others, and 
reduce their expectation of threat. That being said, it is clear that the present findings need to 
be replicated in a clinical sample before any implications concerning therapeutic interventions 
can be identified.  
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Table 1. To-be-remembered words 
Threat-related Words Positive Words 
abandon insult achieved joy 
agony isolated admire lead 
alone jeer adore masterful 
bad kill appointed overcome 
block lonely befriend popular 
blood maim calm praise 
collapse manipulate clever prominent 
controlled mock comfort promote 
criticize pain command recommend 
defeated powerless confident resolute 
dependent reject delight respect 
deprive restrain director reward 
deride restrict elegant romance 
deterred ridicule embrace talented 
failure snigger encourage thrill 
friendless stupid excite triumph 
helpless ugly favorite warm 
humiliate worthless honey welcome 
hurt wound honor winning 
inadequate insult invite wise 
 
 
  
 23 
Table 2. Recall performance in the low and high paranoia groups 
 
 Low Paranoia Group 
Mean words recalled (SD) 
High Paranoia Group 
Mean words recalled (SD) 
Self; threat 4.17 (2.44) 4.83 (2.56) 
Self; positive 3.83 (2.39) 5.57 (2.45) 
Other; threat 2.80 (1.63) 4.40 (2.39) 
Other; positive 3.13 (1.50) 3.30 (1.82) 
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Figure 1. Number of threat related or positive words recalled by each group when 
processed in relation to the self or another.   
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